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Casenote

Milavetz, Gallop & Milavetz, PA. v. United
States: "In Contemplation Of' the Meaning,
Applicability, and Validity of Attorney
Restrictions in the BAPCPA

I.

INTRODUCTION

In Milavetz, Gallop & Milavetz, PA. v. United States,' the Supreme
Court of the United States held that, under section 227 of the Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act of 2005 (BAPCPA),2
attorneys who provide bankruptcy counsel are "debt relief agencies."'
The Court also held two BAPCPA provisions constitutional: one provision
that prevented debt relief agencies from advising a debtor to incur more
debt in contemplation of bankruptcy 4 and another that imposed
In light of the
disclosure requirements on debt relief agencies.'
inconsistent and unclear interpretations of BAPCPA provisions

1.
2.
of 11
3.
4.
5.

130 S. Ct. 1324 (2010).
Pub. L. No. 109-8, § 227, 119 Stat. 23, 67 (codified as amended in scattered sections
U.S.C.).
Milavetz, 130 S. Ct. at 1331.
Id. at 1334.
Id. at 1341.
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considered in this case, the Court's ruling acts to ease concerns that
stem from incipient First Amendment 6 challenges to BAPCPA.
II.

FACTUAL BACKGROUND

Two clients came to the law firm of Milavetz, Gallop & Milavetz, P.A.,
seeking counsel on the possibility of incurring debt before filing for
bankruptcy.! The Milavetz law firm, along with the firm's president, a
bankruptcy attorney within the firm, and the two clients (Milavetz),
brought a pre-enforcement action in the United States District Court for
the District of Minnesota, asking for a declaratory judgment that several
provisions of BAPCPA § 227' did not apply to attorneys or were
unconstitutional as applied to attorneys.' As a preliminary consideration, Milavetz asked whether attorneys are within the definition of debt
relief agencies set forth in BAPCPA.1 o Provided that attorneys are debt
relief agencies, Milavetz further questioned the constitutionality of
§ 526(a)(4) of the Bankruptcy Code," which prohibits a debt relief
agency from advising a client to incur more debt when contemplating
bankruptcy.12 Milavetz also questioned the constitutionality of 11
U.S.C. § 528(aX4)13 and (bX2), 14 which mandate certain disclosure
requirements for debt relief agencies in their advertising." The suit
asked the district court to find these provisions inapplicable or unconstitutional as to attorneys, such that they may advise their clients to incur
additional debt and avoid the burden of disclosure requirements in
advertisements. 1

The district court granted Milavetz's motion for summary judgment,
finding that attorneys were excluded from BAPCPA's definition of debt
relief agency, and that the questioned provisions of BAPCPA were
unconstitutional as to attorneys. 1 The United States Court of Appeals
for the Eighth Circuit affirmed in part and reversed in part.1 " The

6.
7.
2008).
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.

U.S. CONST. amend. I.
Milavetz, Gallop & Milavetz, P.A. v. United States, 541 F.3d 785, 788 n.1 (8th Cir.
Pub. L. No. 109-8, § 227, 119 Stat. 23, 67 (2005).
Milavetz, 541 F.3d at 788.
Id. at 789.
11 U.S.C. § 526(a)(4) (2006).
Id.; Milavetz, 541 F.3d at 788.
11 U.S.C. § 528(aX4) (2006).
11 U.S.C. § 528(b)(2) (2006).
Milavetz, 541 F.3d at 788-89; see also 11 U.S.C. § 528(aX4), (bX2).
Milavetz, Gallop & Milavetz, P.A. v. United States, 130 S. Ct. 1324, 1330-31(2010).
Milavetz, 541 F.3d at 788.
Id.
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court determined that attorneys were included in BAPCPA's definition
of debt relief agency" and noted that the issue was one of first impression among federal courts of appeals.20 In so determining, the court
relied on a plain-language interpretation of BAPCPA and eschewed the
district court's use of the canon of constitutional avoidance to read
attorneys out of the definition of debt relief agency.2' The court of
appeals also disagreed with the district court's finding on the § 528
disclosure requirements; the court of appeals held the disclosure
requirements were a restriction on commercial speech and applied a
rational basis standard of review, concluding that the requirements
passed constitutional scrutiny.22 Having reversed on two issues, the
court affirmed the district court's ruling that § 526(aX4) was unconstitutional as applied to attorneys.2 3 The court of appeals determined that
the prohibition on advice to incur more debt was overbroad and would
include nonabusive advice; therefore, the prohibition was not narrowly
tailored to stand up to constitutional scrutiny.24
The Supreme Court granted certiorari due to conflict among the
federal courts of appeals on the breadth and constitutionality of
§ 526(a)(4). 25 Unanimously, the Court affirmed the Eighth Circuit's
inclusion of attorneys in the definition of debt relief agency as well as
the constitutionality of the disclosure requirements of § 528, while
reversing the court of appeals finding on the unconstitutionality of
§ 526(a)(4). 26

19. Id. at 792.
20. Id. at 790.
21. Id. at 791-92. The canon of constitutional avoidance requires "that where an
otherwise acceptable construction of a statute would raise serious constitutional problems,
the Court will construe the statute to avoid such problems unless such construction is
plainly contrary to the intent of Congress." Id. at 791 (quoting Edward J. DeBartolo Corp.
v. Fla. Gulf Coast Bldg. & Constr. Trades Council, 485 U.S. 568, 575 (1988)) (internal
quotation marks omitted). The court of appeals determined that interpreting the definition
of debt relief agency to exclude attorneys would run contrary to the intent of Congress;
thus, the canon of constitutional avoidance did not apply. Id.
22. Id. at 795-97.
23. Id. at 794.
24. Id. For examples of nonabusive advice to incur debt in contemplation of filing, see
infra notes 59, 66.
25. Milavetz, 130 S. Ct. at 1331.
26.

Id. at 1329.
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LEGAL BACKGROUND

Enactment of the BAPCPA
On April 20, 2005, Congress enacted the Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention
and Consumer Protection Act of 2005 (BAPCPA). 27 The aim of BAPCPA was to reconstruct a national bankruptcy system such that the
process would be "fair for both debtors and creditors," with the specific
goal of restoring personal financial accountability in bankruptcy
filings. 28 To increase systemic accountability, BAPCPA "substantially
augment[ed] the responsibilities of those ... who counsel debtors with
respect to obtaining [consumer bankruptcy] relief."29
BAPCPA includes several provisions that mandate certain behavior
from debt relief agencies.ao Debt relief agencies are defined in BAPCPA
as "any person who provides any bankruptcy assistance to an assisted

A.

person,"a" with such assistance further defined as service provided to a

person with the "purpose of providing information, advice, counsel,...
or. . . legal representation with respect to a [bankruptcy] proceeding.""
Under BAPCPA, debt relief agencies cannot encourage an "assisted
person"" to engage in specified financial behavior, including a prohibition against advice "to incur more debt in contemplation of' filing for
bankruptcy." Furthermore, BAPCPA regulates debt relief agencies by
requiring certain disclosures in advertisements.

27. Pub. L. No. 109-8, 119 Stat. 23.
28. H.R. REP. No. 109-31, pt. 1, at 2 (2005), reprinted in 2005 U.S.C.C.A.N. 88, 89.
Despite the explicit purpose contained within the legislative history of BAPCPA, many
critics believe that BAPCPA's purpose did not relate to curbing bankruptcy abuse but was
an effort of consumer credit industry lobbies to reduce the total number of bankruptcies,
abusive or otherwise. See, e.g., Sean C. Currie, The Multiple Purposes of Bankruptcy:
Restoring Bankruptcy's Social InsuranceFunction After BAPCPA, 7 DEPAUL Bus. & COM.
L.J. 241, 248-52 (2009); see also Michelle J. White, Bankruptcy Reform Gave CreditorsToo

Much, WASH. POST, Aug. 21, 2006, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article
/2006/08/19/AR2006081900413.html.
29. H.R. REP. No. 109-31, pt. 1, at 2.
30. See, e.g., 11 U.S.C. §§ 526-528 (2006).
31. 11 U.S.C. § 101(12A) (2006).
32. 11 U.S.C. § 101(4A) (2006).
33. An "assisted person" is defined under the code as "any person whose debts consist
primarily of consumer debts and the value of whose nonexempt property is less than
$150,000." 11 U.S.C. § 101(3) (2006).
34. 11 U.S.C. § 526(aX4) (2006).
35. 11 U.S.C. § 528(a)(4), (bX2) (2006).
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B.

Are Attorneys "Debt Relief Agencies"?
Aside from the Eighth Circuit's ruling in Milavetz, only one other
appellate court had considered the scope of debt relief agencies under
BAPCPA. In Hersh v. United States,3 6 the United States Court of
Appeals for the Fifth Circuit heard a suit filed by a Texas bankruptcy
attorney, which alleged that attorneys were not debt relief agencies
under BAPCPA." The court held that bankruptcy attorneys were debt
relief agencies for three key reasons.3 " First, the court noted that 11
U.S.C. § 101(12A) provides several exclusions to the definition of debt
relief agency, yet attorneys are not one of those exclusions." Second,
the court recognized that the definition of "bankruptcy assistance" under
11 U.S.C. § 101(4A) includes services related to "legal representation."'o
Finally, the court cited the legislative history of BAPCPA as indicative
of Congress's intent to include attorneys within the meaning of debt
relief agency.4 1
Several federal district courts have ruled on the extent to which
attorneys are included in the meaning of debt relief agency, yet these
rulings did not yield a definitive statement on the inclusion of attorneys. In In re Attorneys at Law & Debt Relief Agencies," the United
States Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of Georgia was the
first to opine on the scope of the term." Issuing an opinion on the
effective date of BAPCPA, the court found attorneys outside the meaning
of debt relief agencies, reasoning that an inclusive reading would require
"a breathtakingly expansive interpretation of federal law to usurp state
regulation."'5 In In re Reyes," the United States Bankruptcy Court
for the Southern District of Florida echoed this reasoning, declaring that

36. 553 F.3d 743 (2008).
37. Id. at 747.

38. Id. at 750-51.
39. Id. at 750.

40. Id. at 750-51 (emphasis omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted).
41. Id. at 751.
42. See id. at 750 n.5.
43. 332 B.R. 66 (Bankr. S.D. Ga. 2005).
44. Id. at 67; see also In re Irons, 379 B.R. 680, 685-86 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. 2007)
(discussing the ruling of In re Attorneys).
45. 332 B.R. at 71; see In re Irons, 379 B.R. at 685-86 (noting that In re Attorneys was
decided "on the effective date of the statute"). Chief among the textual concerns of the court
in In re Attorneys was the absence of "attorney" in the § 101(12A) definition of debt relief
agency, the express exclusion of attorneys in the 11 U.S.C. § 110(aXl) (2006) definition of
bankruptcy petition preparer, and the absence of debt relief agency within the 11 U.S.C
§ 101(4) (2006) definition of attorney. 332 B.R. at 69.
46. 361 B.R. 276 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 2007).
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attorneys are not within the scope of debt relief agencies and lamenting
the breadth of BAPCPA's language: "[W]hile the experts who drafted
BAPC[P]A are entitled to a failing grade in Legislative Drafting 101, the
[ciourt is left to determine what Congress intended." The court noted
concerns that BAPCPA might step on the traditional state role in
overseeing attorney conduct." The court also reasoned that if Congress
had intended to regulate attorney conduct, it would have expressly
included the word "attorney" in the definition of debt relief agency. 9
Despite some courts' adamant defense of the exclusionary point of
view, the majority of district courts have included attorneys within the
meaning of debt relief agency.o In In re Irons," the United States
Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of Texas included attorneys
within the scope of the term, determining that it was within the plain
meaning of BAPCPA.5 2 Similarly, the United States Bankruptcy Court
for the Eastern District of Virginia held in In re Robinson" that
attorneys must adhere to the written contract requirement of debt relief
agencies within BAPCPA, declaring that "there can be little doubt that
the requirement .

.

. applies to attorneys.""

Generally, courts have

included attorneys within the definition of debt relief agencies under
BAPCPA."
Is "in Contemplation of' UnconstitutionallyOverbroad?
In Olsen v. Gonzales,5 decided in August 2006, the United States
District Court for the District of Oregon held 11 U.S.C. § 526(a)(4) to be
unconstitutionally overbroad." The court reasoned that the Government has a compelling interest in preventing speech that is unlawful or
unethical, as in advice that is abusive of the bankruptcy system.
There are some situations, however, when advice to incur "debt 'in
C.

47. Id. at 279.
48. Id.
49. Id. at 280.
50. Milavetz, Gallop & Milavetz, P.A. v. United States, 541 F.3d 785, 790 (8th Cir.
2008).
51. 379 B.R. 680 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. 2007).
52. Id. at 685-86.
53. 368 B.R. 492 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 2007).
54. Id. at 500 n.7.
55. See, e.g, Olsen v. Gonzales, 350 B.R. 906, 912 (D. Or. 2006); Conn. Bar Ass'n v.
United States, 394 B.R. 274, 280 (D. Conn. 2008); In re Mendoza, 347 B.R. 34, 38 n.6
(Bankr. W.D. Tex. 2006).
56. 350 B.R. 906 (D. Or. 2006).
57. Id. at 916.
58. See id. at 915 n.5, 916.
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contemplation' of bankruptcy" is lawful and financially prudent."
"Thus, [§1 526(a)[(4)] prevents lawyers from giving clients their best
advice"; therefore, § 526(aX4) is unconstitutionally overbroad.60
In November 2006, an attorney brought a facial challenge to the
constitutional validity of § 526(aX4) in Zelotes v. Martini,6 1 and the
United States District Court for the District of Connecticut held that the
provision unconstitutionally chilled permissible speech of the attorney.62 Calling § 526(a)(4) "a prophylactic rule," the court recognized
that the prohibition extends to "any additional debt in contemplation of
bankruptcy" and articulated concerns that such a broad proscription
would rule out certain prudent and lawful advice by an attorney."
Three months later, in February of 2007, the same Connecticut district
court reaffirmed that finding of unconstitutionality in Zelotes v.
Adams.64 On motion for reconsideration, the Government offered a
narrower interpretation of "in contemplation of," asking the court to
limit the prohibition of § 526(aX4) to refer only to instances when the
attorney advises the debtor to incur more debt "because" of an intention
to file for bankruptcy. The court rejected such a broad reading and
articulated three more instances, beyond those provided by the court in
Olsen, in which an attorney would be acting responsibly and with
financial prudence in advising a client to incur more debt before filing
6
for bankruptcy." In Connecticut Bar Ass'n v. United States,"
a third

59. Id. at 916 ("That situation could be the case when: (1) refinancing at a lower rate
to reduce payments and forestall ... bankruptcy; or (2) taking on secured debt ... that
would survive bankruptcy and also enable the debtor to continue to get to work and make
payments.").
60. Id.
61. 352 B.R. 17 (D. Conn. 2006).
62. Id. at 24-25.
63. Id. at 24.
64. 363 B.R. 660, 666 (D. Conn. 2007).
65. Id. at 664. The Government supported its argument with the Supreme Court's
interpretation in United States v. Wells, 283 U.S. 102 (1931), of"in contemplation of death."
Adams, 363 B.R. at 664 (internal quotation marks omitted). The Court in Wells
determined that "'in contemplation of death' mean [t] that the thought of death is the
impelling cause of the transfer," not that the thought of death was imminent at the time
of transfer. 283 U.S. at 118-19. In Adams the Government argued that a similar
interpretation of "in contemplation of" should be adhered to in reading § 526(aX4), such
that advice to incur debt is only prohibited when impending bankruptcy is the impelling
cause of the advice. 363 B.R. at 664 (internal quotation marks omitted).
66. Adams, 363 B.R. at 665 (footnote omitted) ("[I]t might be finally [sic] prudent ...
to ... (3) take out a loan to pay the filing fee in a bankruptcy case or to obtain the services
of a bankruptcy attorney, (4) take out a loan to convert a non-exempt asset to an exempt
asset, or (5) co-sign undischargable student loans.").
67. 394 B.R. 274 (D. Conn. 2008).
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examination by the same court of § 526(aX4) yielded the same conclusion
of unconstitutionality on the basis of overbreadth.6 8
After resolving the scope of "debt relief agency" under BAPCPA, the
Fifth Circuit, in Hersh, ruled on the constitutionality of § 526(a)(4).6 9
Aside from the Eighth Circuit's ruling in Milavetz,o no other federal
appellate court had ruled on the constitutionality of § 526(aX4)." The
Fifth Circuit held that the challenged provision of BAPCPA was
constitutional by reading "in contemplation of' narrowly to include only
advice made with the intent of abusing the bankruptcy system.72 The
keystone of this rationale is the doctrine of constitutional avoidance,
which, according to the court in Hersh, provided a reading of § 526(aX4)
that avoids a "blanket restriction" that would otherwise be overbroad
and unconstitutional." Noting that Congress has a compelling interest
in preventing abuse of the bankruptcy system, the court recognized that
the constitutional hang-up in this BAPCPA restriction was the phrase
"in contemplation of' bankruptcy, which was not narrowly-tailored to
meet the Government's compelling interest. By narrowly construing
the term to apply only to abusive advice, the court created "a limiting
construction of the statute [by] adding a requirement [I nowhere
expressed in the statute."" The court cited the Supreme Court ruling
in Boos v. Barry6 as an authority for adopting a modifying construction
on an unrestricted statutory regulation."
Because restricting "in

68. Id. at 282, 284. Addressing the concerns of the Government that the court was
misreading "in contemplation of," the court maintained that the provision still overreached
to instances in which the attorney has a fiduciary duty, in the name of zealous representation, to give the legal advice that BAPCPA prohibits. Id. at 283. In seeking a resolution
in line with the purpose of BAPCPA, the court suggested that "Ii]f the government seeks
to prevent manipulation of the bankruptcy system, a more narrowly tailored approach
would be to penalize those who take on certain types of debts, rather than prohibiting legal
advice about permissible courses of action." Id.
69. See 553 F.3d at 764.
70. See 541 F.3d at 794.
71. Hersh, 553 F.3d at 752. The ruling in Hersh, which reads "in contemplation of"
narrowly to avoid constitutional problems, conflicts with the Eighth Circuit's broad reading
in Milavetz. Compare id. at 756, with Milavetz, 541 F.3d at 794. This conflict was the

basis for the Supreme Court's issuance of certiorari in Milavetz, Gallop & Milavetz, PA.
v. United States, 130 S. Ct. 1324, 1331 (2010).
72. Hersh, 553 F.3d at 756.
73. Id. at 753-54.
74. Id. at 755-56.
75. Id. at 758 (emphasis omitted) (citing Boos v. Barry, 485 U.S. 312, 330-31 (1988)).
76. 485 U.S. 312 (1988).
77. Hersh, 553 F.3d at 757-58. As further justification for adding such a limitation, the
Fifth Circuit extensively reviewed the legislative history and proffered the legislative
purpose imbued in that history: that Congress adopted BAPCPA to combat abuse of the
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contemplation of" to abusive prefiling advice excludes advice made in
good faith and in legal prudence, the Fifth Circuit held that § 526(aX4)
was not unconstitutionally overbroad."
D.

Are BAPCPA Disclosure Requirements Unconstitutional?
Two seminal Supreme Court cases lay out the appropriate standard
of scrutiny for compelled commercial speech. In CentralHudson Gas &
Electric Corp. v. Public Service Commission," the Court articulated a
middle scrutiny standard for speech that "is neither misleading nor
related to unlawful activity."8 0 This scrutiny test uses four prongs: (1)
whether the speech is unlawful or misleading; (2) whether the government has a substantial interest in compelling the speech; (3) whether the
substantial interest is directly advanced by the regulation; and (4)
whether it is narrowly tailored in such advancement." The Court
clarified the operation of the first prong in In re R.M.J.,2 noting that
while "[t]ruthful advertising related to lawful activities is entitled to ...
protectionfl," when advertisements are "inherently misleading or ...
prove[n] .

.

. in fact [to be] subject to abuse," the Government may

impose reasonable restrictions.
In Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel of the Supreme Court of
Ohio,' the Court addressed the scrutiny level applicable when the first
prong of Central Hudson is not met.85 Zauderer involved a disciplinary
proceeding for an Ohio attorney who challenged the constitutionality of
disciplinary rules prohibiting misleading advertising." In considering
First Amendment rights in commercial speech, the Court held that
disclosure requirements may have the effect of chilling protected speech;
however, "as long as disclosure requirements are reasonably related to
the [Government's] interest in preventing deception of consumers," those
requirements do not infringe on the First Amendment rights of the
advertiser."

bankruptcy system, and such a construction is the natural extension of that legislative
purpose. Id. at 760-61.
78. Id. at 763.

79.
80.
81.
82.
83.

447 U.S. 557 (1980).
Id. at 564.
Id. at 566.
455 U.S. 191 (1982).
Id. at 203.

84.

471 U.S. 626 (1985).

85. See id. at 638.
86.
87.

Id. at 631, 634.
Id. at 651.
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In Olsen the District of Oregon considered the constitutionality of the
disclosure requirements of 11 U.S.C. § 528 in light of Zauderer and
Central Hudson, finding that, in a facial challenge, BAPCPA disclosure
requirements in advertisements did not violate the First Amendment as
compelled commercial speech.8 9 The court applied the Central Hudson
four-prong test to determine the constitutionality of BAPCPA's disclosure
requirements because, prior to the legislated imposition of the requirements, attorneys did not advertise in ways that were deceptive or
misleading.9" Under the intermediate scrutiny standard, the court
further found that the provisions met the other three prongs of the
Central Hudson test for the following three reasons: (1) the purpose of
preventing fraud was a substantial interest, (2) there was direct
advancement of that interest because attorneys can provide supplemental information in their advertisements, and (3) the requirements were
narrowly drawn to the court's satisfaction."
In Connecticut Bar Ass'n, the District of Connecticut reached a
different conclusion regarding the disclosure requirements of § 528,
finding unconstitutionality because the requirements were not reasonably related to the Government's interest in preventing deception of
consumers under the Zauderer test." The court applied the more
lenient Zauderer test, reasoning that the Zauderer test was more
appropriate than the Central Hudson test when regulation involves
disclosure requirements. Even using the more lenient test, the court
found there was no reasonable relation between the Government's
interest of preventing fraudulent speech and the regulation imposed by
BAPCPA. 4 The court reasoned that the disclosure statement-"We help
people file for bankruptcy relief under the Bankruptcy Code"-applied to
attorneys providing a broad range of services, not all of which necessitated bankruptcy relief.s Consequently, the court found the required
disclosure statement to be misleading; therefore, the statement was not
reasonably related to the Government's interest in preventing consumer
deception."

88. 11 U.S.C. §§ 528 (2006).
89. 350 B.R. at 919-20.
90. Id. at 920 (finding that the first prong of Central Hudson was satisfied).
91. Id. at 920-21.
92. See 394 B.R. at 289-90.
93. Id. at 289 n.16.
94. Id. at 290.
95. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
96. Id.
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IV. COURT's RATIONALE

A. Majority Opinion
In Milavetz9 ' the Supreme Court granted certiorari to settle a conflict
among the courts of appeals as to the constitutionality of the BAPCPA
§ 2279" speech restrictions." Justice Sotomayor delivered the opinion
of the Court, which was unanimous except for separate concurrences by
Justice Scalia and Justice Thomas."'o
The Court first discussed the threshold issue of whether BAPCPA
includes attorneys within the meaning of debt relief agencies.o The
Court adopted the Government's interpretation of BAPCPA as including
attorneys within the plain meaning of debt relief agencies.102 Debt
relief agencies are defined in BAPCPA as entities that provide "bankruptcy assistance,"0 ' and bankruptcy assistance sometimes takes the
form of "legal representation with respect to a case or proceeding."'0 4
The Court reasoned that some forms of bankruptcy assistance can only
be provided by attorneys; therefore, including attorneys within the
definition of debt relief agencies comports with a plain reading of the
text. 10 Buttressing this conclusion, the Court pointed out that 11
U.S.C. § 101(12A) details several exceptions to the meaning of debt relief
agency, and in drafting this section, Congress did not exclude attorneys.o' In a footnote, the majority opinion noted that the legislative
history also hints at no such exclusion. 07
Milavetz suggested that the absence of attorneys from the exceptions
of § 101(12A) should be considered in light of BAPCPA's explicit
exclusion of attorneys within the 11 U.S.C. § 110(aXl)os definition of
"bankruptcy petition preparer."0 9 As Justice Sotomayor pointed out,
however, that reading is implausible unless bankruptcy petition

97. 130 S. Ct. 1324 (2010).
98. Pub. L. No. 109-8, § 227, 119 Stat. 23, 67 (2005).
99. 130 S. Ct. at 1331.
100. Id. at 1329.
101. Id. at 1331.
102. Id.
103. 11 U.S.C. § 101(12A) (2006).

104.
105.
106.
107.
Court's
108.
109.

11 U.S.C. § 101(4A) (2006).

Milavetz, 130 S. Ct. at 1332; see also 11 U.S.C. § 110(eX2) (2006).
Milavetz, 130 S. Ct. at 1332.
Id. at 1332 n.3. Justice Scalia's concurrence focuses on his disagreement with the
inclusion of this footnote. Id. at 1341-42 (Scalia, J., concurring).
11 U.S.C. § 110(aX1) (2006).
Milavetz, 130 S. Ct. at 1332 (internal quotation marks omitted).
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preparers are the only debt relief agencies.o Milavetz also proffered
a federalism argument, contending that the inclusion of attorneys within
the scope of debt relief agencies creates a reading that clashes with the
role of state governments in regulating the legal profession."' The
Court dismissed that logic by noting that "Congress would have had no
reason to enact that provision if the debt-relief-agency provisions did not
apply to attorneys."ll 2 Lastly, the Court rejected Milavetz's argument
for a narrow reading based on the canon of constitutional avoidance,
finding that the canon is only applicable in the presence of statutory
ambiguity, of which there is none here. 113
The majority opinion then moved to Milavetz's assertion that 11
U.S.C. § 526(aX4)n 4 is unconstitutional "as a broad, content-based
restriction on attorney-client communications that is not adequately
tailored to constrain only speech the Government has a substantial
According to the Court, the Eighth Circuit,
interest in restricting."'
which found the restriction unconstitutionally overbroad, read § 526(aX4) as a ban on advice to incur any debt in contemplation of filing."6
Justice Sotomayor spurned this approach, instead adopting a narrower
reading of the restriction that included only conduct that is "designed to
manipulate the protections of the bankruptcy system," basing that
reading on the meaning of the phrase "in contemplation of.""'
Justice Sotomayor based her explanation of the phrase "in contemplation of' on the Court's ruling in Conrad, Rubin & Lesser v. Pender,"'i
in conjunction with context provided by other sections of BAPCPA." 9
The Court noted that the critical issue in Pender was "whether the

110. Id.
111. Id.
112. Id. The Court also reasoned that the federalism argument is weak because
"Congress and the bankruptcy courts have long overseen aspects of attorney conduct in this
area of substantial federal concern." Id. at 1332-33. Milavetz further argued that, because
one of the exceptions found in 11 U.S.C. § 101(12A) includes "employee[s] or agent[s]" of
a person who provides bankruptcy assistance, the absence of "partners" creates the problem
that entire law firms must comply with BAPCPA's behavioral restrictions on the basis of
one partner's conduct. 130 S. Ct. at 1333 (internal quotation marks omitted). The Court
rejected this argument because a partnership, by its nature, requires that its partners
assume certain responsibilities jointly, and oftentimes one partner's conduct dictates the
entire behavior of the partnership. Id.
113. Id. at 1333.
114. 11 U.S.C. § 526(aX4) (2006).
115. Milavetz, 130 S. Ct. at 1334.
116. Id.
117. Id. at 1335-36 (internal quotation marks omitted).
118. 289 U.S. 472 (1933).
119. Milavetz, 130 S. Ct. at 1336.
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thought of bankruptcy was the impelling cause of the transaction."120
Adopting a similar construction, the Court held that advice to incur more
debt, made in expectation of discharge, is per se abusive. 2 11The Court
pointed to contextual support, noting that BAPCPA augments protections already in place under the old bankruptcy code that guarded
against accumulating more debt in anticipation of discharge. 1 22 Under
BAPCPA, means-testing provisions provide that a bankruptcy filer's
petition is presumptively abusive in certain instances, a change which
reflects increased protections against abusive accumulation of debt made
prior to filing. 123 Aside from the textual arguments, Justice Sotomayor
also pointed out the practicality of a narrow construction: "It would
make scant sense to prevent attorneys and other debt relief agencies
from advising individuals thinking of filing for bankruptcy about options
that would be beneficial to both those individuals and their creditors."'24 The Court held that § 526(aX4) is narrowly tailored to apply
only to advice that encourages an assisted person to incur "debt when
the impelling reason" for such counsel is imminent bankruptcy.'12
Turning to Milavetz's remaining argument, the majority determined
that § 526(a)(4) is not impermissibly vague.126 Milavetz contended
that the difficulty in determining what is abusive advice will inevitably
chill protected speech.127 The Court discarded this contention by
noting that determination of what is abusive is irrelevant, and the
question of applicability relates to whether the impelling cause of this
advice is impending bankruptcy.12 Any advice given with the expectation of obtaining discharge is abusive per se, so the relevant question is
whether the advice was given in anticipation of such discharge. 129
Finally, the Court addressed the disclosure requirements of 11 U.S.C.
§ 528(aX4)13 0 and (b)(2)131 and agreed with the Eighth Circuit's finding of constitutionality. 3 2 The issue of constitutionality turned on the
applicable standard of scrutiny for provisions regulating commercial

120.
121.
122.
123.
124.
125.
126.
127.
128.
129.
130.
131.
132.

Id. (quoting Pender, 289 U.S. at 477) (internal quotation marks omitted).
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1336-37.
Id. at 1337.
Id.
Id. at 1338.
Id.
Id.
See id.
11 U.S.C. § 528(aX4) (2006).
11 U.S.C. § 528(b)(2) (2006).
Milavetz, 130 S. Ct. at 1341.
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speech.'
Milavetz sought application of the intermediate scrutiny
standard articulated in Central Hudson Gas & Electric Corp. v. Public
Service Commission;134 the Government sought application of the more
lenient Zauderer v. Office of DisciplinaryCounsel of the Supreme Court
of Ohio"' standard."a' The Court decided to apply the Zauderer
standard, reasoning that the less exacting scrutiny is appropriate given
the purpose of the disclosure requirements in "combat[ting] the problem
of inherently misleading commercial advertisements." 13 Specifically,
the Court pointed to its previous holding in In re R.M.J. 3 as evidence
that a low scrutiny should apply in regulation of advertisements for
professional services due to the augmented risk of deception posed by
such advertisements."' Applying a reasonable-relation standard, as
articulated in Zauderer,'4 0 the Court addressed Milavetz's contentions
that there was a lack of a reasonable relation between the disclosure
requirements and the Government's interest in preventing consumer
deception.14 ' The Court alleviated Milavetz's concern that "'debt relief
agency' is confusing and misleading" by noting that bankruptcy
advertisers can clarify the meaning of the term by providing other
information in the advertisement that is neither prescribed nor
proscribed by BAPCPA.' 42 Finding a reasonable relation, the Court
upheld the constitutionality of the § 528 disclosure requirements,
affirming the ruling of the Eighth Circuit. 4 3
Concurring Opinions: Scalia and Thomas
Justice Scalia concurred in part and in the judgment, only disagreeing
The
with the contents of footnote three of the majority opinion.'
use
of
to
the
opposition
Scalia's
Justice
disagreement stemmed from
45
He
of
a
statute.1
meaning
legislative history in interpreting the
B.

133. Id. at 1339.
134. 447 U.S. 557, 564 (1980).
135. 471 U.S. 626, 651 (1985).
136. Milavetz, 130 S. Ct. at 1339.
137. Id. at 1339-40.
138. 455 U.S. 191 (1982).
139. Milavetz, 130 S. Ct. at 1340.
140. See 471 U.S. at 651 (holding "that an advertiser's rights are adequately protected
as long as disclosure requirements are reasonably related to the State's interest in
preventing deception of consumers").
141. Milavetz, 130 S. Ct. at 1340-41.
142. Id.
143. Id. at 1341.
144. Id. (Scalia, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
145. Id. at 1341-42. Justice Scalia gives three reasons why legislative history does not
provide evidence of statutory meaning: "(1) [W~e do not know that the members of the
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believed the logic of footnote three-connecting committee reports to
congressional intent-to be "a bridge too far."14 6
The concurrence of Justice Thomas, in judgment and in part, related
to the majority's finding of constitutionality on the disclosure requirements of § 528.147 Justice Thomas expressed his dissatisfaction with
the Zauderer standard of scrutiny that applies to restrictions on
Although he agreed that the Zaudermisleading commercial speech.'
er standard applied to the constitutional challenge in Milavetz, he noted
his eagerness to reexamine the standard to determine the extent to
which it protects against government-mandated disclosure requirements."4 s Justice Thomas lamented that Milavetz involved an asapplied challenge to the constitutionality of the disclosure requirements
because the dearth of evidence on the nature of Milavetz's advertisements precluded a ruling on the facial constitutionality of the disclosures.5 o As such, Justice Thomas could not reexamine the Zauderer
standard and confirmed that Milavetz's constitutional challenge of
§ 528's disclosure requirements failed.15 '
V.

IMPLICATIONS

It is no surprise, nor is it a secret, that bankruptcy attorneys were not
eager to embrace the litany of regulations instituted by the new
Bankruptcy Code in 2005.152 The reluctance of bankruptcy attorneys
was augmented by the general perception that BAPCPA1 ,3 was poorly
drafted and that the statutory overhaul left a maze of ambiguity and
uncertainty for attorneys to navigate.'"'
Chief among attorneys'

Committee read the Report [of the House Committee on the Judiciary, (2) it is almost
certain that they did not vote on the Report (that is not the practice), and (3) even if they
did read and vote on it, they were not, after all, those who made this law." Id.
146. Id. at 1342. Justice Scalia points out the Court's acknowledgement of the
footnote's extraneity and the peril of using legislative history in statutory interpretation:
"The footnote advises conscientious attorneys that . . . they must spend time and their
clients' treasure combing the annals of legislative history in all cases . . . ." Id.

147. Id. (Thomas, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
148. Id. at 1343.
149. Id.
150. Id. at 1344.
151. Id. at 1344-45.
152. See Keith M. Lundin, Ten Principlesof BAPCPA: Not What was Advertised, 24 AM.
BANKR. INST. J. 1 (2005); see also Catherine E. Vance & Corinne Cooper, Nine Traps and
One Slap: Attorney Liability Under the New Bankruptcy Law, 79 AM. BANKR. L.J. 283
(2005).
153. Pub. L. No. 109-8, 119 Stat. 23 (2005).
154. See Henry J. Sommer, Trying to Make Sense Out of Nonsense: Representing
Consumers Underthe "BankruptcyAbuse Preventionand Consumer ProtectionAct of 2005,"
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concerns was the specter of increased liability corresponding with
In
measures of BAPCPA designed to increase accountability."'
Milavetz,"' the Supreme Court resolved some ambiguities created by
the deficient drafting of BAPCPA; however, ambiguities and practical
problems for bankruptcy attorneys still endure.
The Court's holding that 11 U.S.C. § 526(aX4)15 ' is constitutional as
to prohibitions on advice given in contemplation of bankruptcy when
filing is the impelling reason for the advice resolved a conflict between
adherence to BAPCPA and attorneys' fiduciary duties to their clients."' A major difficulty posed by the § 526(a)(4) prohibition was
that attorneys had to deal with scenarios in which it was financially
prudent to advise clients to incur more debt as part of prefiling
counseling." 9 For example, suppose a potential bankruptcy client
came into an attorney's office and, in the course of considering whether
to file for bankruptcy, asked the attorney if she should sell her home and
rent an apartment instead to reduce her overall debt by eliminating
mortgage payments.160 If renting the apartment would cause the
client to incur lease debt, the bankruptcy attorney could not have
supported such a decision prior to the Milavetz ruling. After Milavetz,
the Court protects attorneys in these instances when a "valid purpose"
is served by such advice, and thus, the advice is financially prudent. 6 1
Unfortunately, the scenario is not always so clearly "valid"; although
the Court resolved part of the conflict by narrowing the § 526(a)(4)
prohibition, the decision in Milavetz left much to the discretion of
bankruptcy attorneys. The Court held that BAPCPA's prohibition
applies when an attorney "advis[es] a debtor to incur more debt because

79 AM. BANKR. L.J. 191, 191-92 (2005); see also In re Attorneys at Law and Debt Relief
Agencies, 332 B.R. 66, 68 (Bankr. S.D. Ga. 2005) ("[Ilntolerable is needless uncertainty in
the minds of the Bar as to their duty under this new statute.").
155. See Vance & Cooper, supra note 152, at 283-84 (comparing enactment of BAPCPA
to a scene from PLATOON (Hemdale Film Corp. 1986) with the attorneys finding out that
BAPCPA is really a booby trap).
156. 130 S. Ct. 1324 (2010).
157. 11 U.S.C. § 526(a)(4) (2006).
158. Milavetz, 130 S. Ct. at 1336.
159. See, e.g., Zelotes v. Adams, 363 B.R. 660, 665 (D. Conn. 2007) (recognizing five
instances in which it would be financially prudent to encourage incurring more debt before
filing for bankruptcy).
160. This is a problematic scenario that was suggested by bankruptcy scholar Eric
Brunstad prior to the Supreme Court's ruling in Milavetz, suggesting the overbreadth of
11 U.S.C. § 526(aX4). See Thomas B. Scheffey, Bankruptcy Attorneys Preparefor Supreme
Court Argument Over Legal Advice Rules, CONN. L. TRIB., Oct. 9, 2009, http://www.law.

com/jsp/ article.jsp?id=1202434405292&hbxlogin=1.
161. Milavetz, 130 S. Ct. at 1336.

2011]1

IN CONTEMPLATION OF

701
Y,162

the debtor is filing for bankruptcy, rather than for a valid purpose.
This begs the question, what is a valid purpose? The residual problem
left by Milavetz is that bankruptcy attorneys have to determine the
range of the term "valid." Imagine the scenario in which a debtor,
preparing to file for bankruptcy, calls her bankruptcy attorney and says
the following: "I don't have insurance or money to pay for the doctor or
Does the bankfor my son's medicine. Can I put it on my Visa?"'
ruptcy attorney consider paying for a child's medicine a valid purpose
under the protection of Milavetz? Although Milavetz resolves situations
that are more clear-cut, attorneys facing shades of gray when deciding
the applicability of § 526(a)(4) cannot look to the language of Justice
Sotomayor's opinion for definitive help in deciding whether they may be
liable for advice under BAPCPA. Essentially, this has the effect of
chilling attorney speech in such a situation, even though it is unclear
whether failing to advise would yield less exposure to liability.
In upholding the constitutionality of the disclosure requirements of 11
U.S.C. § 528,164 the Court imposed a minor burden in requiring
attorneys to add a statement to their bankruptcy advertisement
material.'15 The disclosure, however, might not be so minor when
considered from the perspective of the advertisee because the disclosure
itself is misleading and deceptive.166 Left unaddressed by the Court
in Milavetz, an issue remains regarding the disconnect within 11 U.S.C.
§ 528(b)(2), 167 which requires all "debt relief agenc[ies] provid[ing]
assistance with respect to credit defaults, mortgage foreclosures, eviction
proceedings, excessive debt, debt collection pressure, or inability to pay
The
any consumer debt" to include the disclosure statement. 66
a
are
text,
"We
the
contains
disconnect surfaces because the disclosure
the
under
debt relief agency. We help people file for bankruptcy relief
Bankruptcy Code.""' That language requires disclosure by attorneys
who provide nonfiling services mentioned in § 528(bX2). 70 Constitutional scholar Erwin Chemerinsky points out that this disconnect may

162. Id.
163. Vance & Cooper, supra note 152, at 312 (internal quotation marks omitted).
164. 11 U.S.C. § 528 (2006).
165. See Milavetz, 130 S. Ct. at 1341.
166.

See Connecticut Bar Ass'n v. United States, 394 B.R. 274, 290 (D. Conn. 2008)

(internal quotation marks omitted) (holding § 528 unconstitutional, based on the fact that
the prescribed statement-"We help people file for bankruptcy"-is misleading and confusing
to the consumer).
167. 11 U.S.C. § 528(b)(2) (2006).
168. Id.
169. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
170.

See Connecticut Bar Ass'n, 394 B.R. at 290.
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"actually create more confusion among debtors seeking assistance."171
Because the Court did not address this omission, attorneys remain to
clean up when clients are left confused and misled." 2 Two real options
are available to attorneys in light of this confusion: they may avail
themselves of "'substantially similar' language, ,,171 or they may provide
more information in their advertisement that clarifies the confusion
created by the required language. 7 1
The opinion in Milavetz left some questions unanswered but otherwise
brought order to a state of constitutional flux created by BAPCPA's
inartful drafting. In the face of BAPCPA's ambiguous provisions,
Milavetz occasions some clarity for bankruptcy attorneys, informing
them that, yes, they must conform to BAPCPA because they are debt
relief agencies. Some opacity remains in what advice is "for a valid
purpose" under Milavetz,as and attorneys will still have to guess what
kind of advice falls within the § 526(aX4) prohibition. Because the
courts have failed to address the misleading nature of BAPCPA's
advertisement disclosure requirement, attorneys will have to deal with
clients' confusion, but there are opportunities to do so elsewhere in
advertisements. Overall, Milavetz provides some direction to bankruptcy
attorneys on how to proceed under BAPCPA, and some direction is better
than none at all.
JOSEPH D. ORENSTEIN

171. See Erwin Chemerinsky, Constitutional Issues Posed in the Bankruptcy Abuse
Prevention and Consumer Protection Act of 2005, 79 Am. BANKR. L.J. 571, 578 (2005).
172. See Sommer, supra note 154, at 211.
173. Id.
174. See Milavetz, 130 S. Ct. at 1341.
175.

Id. at 1336.

